On the morning of July 31, 1944, Colonel Chaser of the 8th Mechanized Brigade radioed headquarters with a message that would echo through the halls of the Kremlin: “We are on the shores of the Ria Gulf.” The response was as bizarre as it was symbolic—an order to collect seawater from the Baltic Sea and send it to Moscow. Soon, a bottle of that water stood on Stalin’s desk, a tangible proof of Soviet troops reaching the sea. According to some accounts, Stalin later sent similar bottles to Churchill and Roosevelt, a subtle propaganda move emphasizing the USSR’s successes. This breakthrough near the small Latvian town of Tukums was of great military and political significance, cutting off the German Army Group North from the rest of the Wehrmacht. But the story of the bottles had an unexpected continuation.

The Germans, far from accepting defeat, gathered large forces of infantry and tanks, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen entered the Ria Gulf. On August 20, Wehrmacht tank units, with support from the sea, punched a corridor to the surrounded army group. The next day, Soviet troops lost Tukums, and a narrow passage along the seashore allowed enemy troops to withdraw from the encirclement. Stalin, known for his dark humor, took the bottle of seawater from his table and said, “Return it to Comrade Bagramyan. Let him pour it into the Baltic Sea.” No one then imagined the difficulties of this task. Fierce battles in the Baltic states would continue until the last day of the war, battles that would be forgotten for many years.

In the fall of 1944, the Courland Peninsula became the last part of the Soviet Union liberated by the Red Army. The emergence of this strange enclave was the result of a chain of unusual circumstances and decisions taken by the highest command of the Third Reich. In July 1944, at a meeting with Hitler, the commanders of Army Groups Center and North unanimously demanded an urgent withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states. Guderian even called the position of the Donuts criminal stupidity, but the Führer, as often happened, preferred the opinion of the navy. Admiral Dönitz, commander of the German Navy, intervened and put forward a new argument: the retention of the Baltic states was required to preserve the crews of submarines for the German naval fleet. The North Sea was controlled by the Allies, their planes reached the western Baltic, and only the eastern part of the sea was almost safe for year-round training of submariners. 80% of the U-boat crews were trained here, including on old sailing ships that imitated Allied convoys.

Dönitz actively fought against disbelief in victory. His orders stated, “Everyone who doubts the victory will be shot as a traitor.” Such posters hung in the barracks of submariners. After a failed assassination attempt, Hitler distrusted his generals. Hearing Dönitz categorically state that the North Army Group remains in the Baltic states, Hitler declared that the submarine fleet remained one of his last hopes to wage offensive war. It was impossible to allow Soviet troops to reach the coast of the southern Baltic, create naval bases there, and begin striking German shipping and submarines. This led to the decision to leave Army Group North in the Baltic states and on the Moonsund Islands. The headquarters of Dönitz even developed the Neptune plan, mining the entire coast in case of a Red Army breakthrough. But there were not enough resources.

At the same time, the Red Army’s breakthrough into the Baltic states and the threat of encirclement forced the German troops to hurry to leave Estonia. On September 27, pursuing the departing units, Soviet troops landed on the Moonsund Islands. Simultaneously, Finland’s exit from the war opened the Baltic Fleet’s passage from the Gulf of Finland to the open sea. Soviet torpedo boats immediately began to hunt German transports. The first success came on September 30 near the island of Hiuma. In early October 1944, the Stavka decided to change the direction of the blow. The offensive began on October 5, and on the sixth day of fighting, the advanced units of the 5th Guards Tank Army broke through to the Baltic Sea in the Šiauliai area. Army Group North moved to the Courland Peninsula and ended up in a pocket.

Calculations showed that with the number of Army Group North at 520,000 people, and using all available transport, the evacuation of personnel, weapons, and equipment would take five months. The German admirals proposed evacuating at least elite units, such as the 3rd SS Panzer Corps, but Schörner insisted that Courland would become the second Verdun. For the German command, it was obvious that the Red Army would not sit back and watch the evacuation. With each transported soldier, it would be harder to hold the front, and transports with people would be attacked by Soviet submarines and aviation. On the other hand, it was obvious to everyone that the troops surrounded in Courland were doomed and the war was lost. But the commander of Army Group North, Ferdinand Schörner, convinced his subordinates of the need to defend the Courland pocket. At the same time, he could not reveal Dönitz’s words from the meeting. Instead, he ordered the soldiers to read fake reports about new weapons and a turning point in the war.

Meanwhile, immediately after the capture of Riga, the Stavka tasked Bagramyan and Yeremenko to immediately go on the offensive and eliminate the Courland group. The 1st Shock Army, advancing along the coast of the Ria Gulf, operated most successfully during this period. On October 18, Soviet troops crossed the Lielupe River and captured the village of Kemeri. However, the next day their offensive was stopped near Tukums. Here the Germans used the tactic of nomadic guns—88 mm anti-aircraft guns, Flak 18/36, changed positions after two or three shots, avoiding return fire. In other areas, the Soviet armies met fierce resistance and could not advance. Soon the Germans launched a counterattack with several tank divisions, and by the end of October 21, the Soviet offensive had completely stopped.

Less than a week later, on October 27, the second major offensive of two Baltic fronts began. The plan called for cutting off the 16th and 18th German armies and destroying them in parts. The Soviet command perfectly understood that the supply of the German group in Courland depended entirely on the ports. The offensive was supported by powerful aviation strikes. Soviet night bombers Po-2 dropped not only bombs but also leaflets. The Germans nicknamed them “sewing machines” for the characteristic sound of their engines. On the other side, Schörner planned an offensive toward Memel (now Klaipėda) to link up with the main forces of East Prussia. To implement it, tank divisions of the 16th and 18th Armies were gathered into one fist. As often happened in war, two offensive plans—Soviet and German—collided.

The blow of the 1st Baltic Front was met by advancing German tank divisions. The commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Ivan Bagramyan, decided to commit part of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which included new heavy tanks IS-2. The Germans had already encountered the new Soviet tank and appreciated its powerful gun. Its 122 mm gun confidently destroyed any German armored vehicle, including Tigers. A peculiar tactical technique was invented against the IS-2s. German tanks hid on reverse slopes and set ambushes. Tiger crews sometimes set off smoke bombs next to knocked-out tanks so that the IS-2s would count them as destroyed and pass by. Often the Soviet heavy tank was knocked out before it could detect the enemy. The IS-2 posed a real threat, so the Germans knocked them out first. As a result, the expected breakthrough by the tank army was not achieved, but the German plan to unite with the troops in East Prussia was foiled.

Meanwhile, on the neighboring sector, the 2nd Baltic Front under General Yeremenko advanced toward the city of Saldus. The enemy showed stubborn resistance. The Soviets managed to advance only a few kilometers. Soviet aircraft tried to disrupt German supply lines with massive strikes on Liepāja, but the raids soon ceased due to deteriorating weather. The Germans used captured Soviet ZIS-5 trucks for transport—they were harder to distinguish from the air. In early November 1944, the rasputitsa set in, and after a week of fighting, the offensive of both Soviet fronts ground to a halt.

At a meeting in the Kremlin on November 7, 1944, Zhukov criticized Marshal Vasilevsky, who was responsible for coordinating the Baltic fronts during the Courland offensive. He considered it a mistake to launch two attacks in different directions. According to Zhukov, a single powerful blow could have brought success. In the dispute between Zhukov and Vasilevsky, Stalin sided with the plan of two blows, considering that in difficult terrain with limited roads, several attacks could achieve the desired effect. Later, it turned out that the Germans had intercepted Soviet plans through a defector—a map of the 130th Latvian Corps with marked attack directions was found on a dead officer.

In Army Group North, by contrast, unity of command was preserved throughout the battles for the Baltic states. Using a developed road network, the Germans quickly transferred troops and extracted them from encirclement threats when necessary. Formations of Army Group North, with great combat experience gained during the battles near Leningrad, moved to the Courland Peninsula. They defended on a narrow front—no more than 9 km per division. It was much easier to build defenses among the forests, rivers, and lakes of the Baltics than on open plains. Another advantage was the large number of mobile formations. In Courland, five tank divisions were concentrated on a front of just 220 km. One of them, the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, was transferred from Warsaw but could not break through. Tank divisions became a mobile reserve in defense, capable of quickly moving to threatened sectors, occupying terrain, and launching counterattacks on their own.

In November 1944, Soviet troops began preparing for a new offensive. The main obstacle was the weather. The Soviet command awaited suitable conditions for the normal operation of artillery and aviation. The new operation pursued two tasks: first, to strike at the main supply port of Liepāja; second, to install control over the railroad that ran almost parallel to the front line. For disinformation, the Red Army imitated preparations for a blow toward Ventspils. On December 21, the third Soviet offensive began in the Saldus area. At first, Bagramyan’s units met with success. German artillery was suppressed at the breakthrough site. Soviet infantry moved forward quickly.

At the same time, troops of the 2nd Baltic Front immediately met fierce enemy fire. Soon the secret of the unexpected stubborn resistance was revealed. A dead German officer was found with a map passed by the defector, precisely indicating the boundaries of the 130th Latvian Corps’ offensive. The Wehrmacht command, using the still-functioning railway, pulled reserves to the breakthrough sector. By December 31, after several attempts to shake the enemy’s defense, the Soviet offensive was stopped.

By the end of the year, Hitler’s interest in Courland had almost faded. Under the blows of the Soviet troops and their allies, German defense was cracking on all fronts. The situation in Army Group North worried him least. The same loss of interest was observed in the Soviet Stavka. Troops from the two Baltic fronts began to be transferred to other strategic directions. In January 1945, with the start of the Vistula-Oder Operation, Courland became a donor for the Germans. It was not possible to withdraw the entire army group, but individual divisions were still transferred by sea to Germany. One of the first was the 3rd SS Panzer Corps, which subsequently defended Berlin. Its evacuation was carried out under the code name Blue Ice. Soldiers were given double rations and fake letters from families to raise morale.

Simultaneously with the German troops, the command staff of the Courland group under Ferdinand Schörner was also withdrawn—he was appointed commander of Army Group Center. From January 25, Army Group North was renamed Army Group Courland. Similar changes occurred on the other side of the front. The commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Army General Bagramyan, was sent with his headquarters to East Prussia. Instead of General Yeremenko, Marshal Govorov began to command the 2nd Baltic Front. This front was left alone against the Courland group.

The weakening of the German troops due to the evacuation of infantry and tank units by sea forced the Soviet command to make another attempt to crush the enemy. On February 16, 1945, the fourth major Soviet offensive began. It developed more successfully than in the fall. Soviet units managed to break through German defenses in the area of the town of Vaiņode, but a quick breakthrough of the front was not achieved. The pace was lost. The enemy pulled up reserves and restored the stability of the front. The Germans even used captured Soviet T-34 tanks repainted in gray for counterattacks. This caused panic among the Red Army.

On March 17, the Soviet command made the last attempt to eliminate the surrounded Courland group. The main blow was struck in the area of the city of Saldus. In some sectors, Soviet troops managed to advance deep into the German defense. However, soon the Stavka had to stop the offensive. Two Soviet rifle divisions were themselves surrounded without support from the main forces. Only on March 28, after the most difficult fighting, did the surrounded units manage to break through to their own lines. Soon the fighting in this direction finally ceased.

In those same days, the Red Army entered Danzig. Under these conditions, preserving the Baltic Sea as a training area for submariners lost all meaning. The actions of German troops in Courland finally turned into self-defense of a camp of armed prisoners of war—as the surrounded group was called in the Red Army. On May 8, 1945, when the signing of surrender in Karlshorst had already begun, Soviet radio stations openly transmitted a radiogram with orders to all German ships and vessels to proceed to the ports of Memel and Kolberg. The Soviet command did not particularly count on unquestioning submission and therefore blocked the ports of Courland with Baltic Fleet boats. The boats carried posters on board: “Capitulation or death.” Many crews surrendered without a fight.

On the morning of May 9, Soviet troops took Liepāja without a fight. The mass surrender of Wehrmacht units began. In total, 42 generals, more than 8,000 officers, and 181,000 soldiers, including about 14,000 Latvian volunteers, were taken prisoner in Courland from May 9 to 13. Among the prisoners was SS Brigadeführer Bruno Streckenbach, one of the organizers of the Holocaust. Hiding under the name of an ordinary soldier, he was eventually identified. The Soviet troops captured a great deal of various equipment and weapons.

There were hardly any who remembered the heavy battles in Courland. From October 1944 to May 1945, 90,000 Soviet soldiers laid down their lives there. About 300,000 were wounded. Red Army units could not defeat the besieged enemy troops. The number of German troops, their combat experience, and well-drilled defense tactics prevented this. It was impossible to block the supply routes of the group by sea due to the lack of submarines and aircraft at the Baltic Fleet. At the same time, as a result of the active offensive actions of the two Baltic fronts, the Germans lost the opportunity to withdraw large reserves from Courland and plug holes in their collapsing front. Experienced and well-armed German units could have strengthened the enemy’s defense and prevented the Red Army from taking Berlin before the Allies.

As Schörner later admitted, “Every day Courland cost the Russians thousands of lives, but bought us time for the defense of Germany.” The bottle of seawater returned to Bagramyan became a bitter symbol—the sea was reached, but the enemy held on. And yet, the noose around the Courland group tightened with each passing week, while the war’s final act unfolded far to the west.

By May 12, the last shots had faded. Soviet officers walked through the camps, counting the stunned, exhausted enemy. In Courland, a German army had held out for eight months—and then simply vanished into captivity.

For the Red Army, it was a strange victory. The enemy was never crushed in battle; he was starved, bypassed, and finally ordered to surrender. The bottle of Baltic water, returned to Bagramyan with Stalin’s grim joke, became a footnote in a war of unimaginable scale.

Schörner’s boast—that every day cost the Russians thousands of lives—was partly true. Yet Berlin fell anyway, and the Courland pocket became a museum of a lost cause. The soldiers who survived would remember the endless forests, the rain, and the silence after the guns stopped.

Was Courland a strategic necessity, a stubborn folly, or a sacrifice that bought Germany a few more weeks of existence? What do you think?